

*has a copy .  
Mary  
Jan 29*

Tape 53

Side A, 3 1/2 - 4

25X1

MEMO FOR: [REDACTED]

FROM: DCI

25X1

[REDACTED] will visit with me at 1500 on Thursday.

I told him to be at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel where he is staying and that we would pick him up there at 2:30. I told him to look for a tan Buick.

25X1

I'd like to meet with him for 15 minutes and then have Bob Ames, Bob Bowie if he would like, [REDACTED] and perhaps one other join us for another half-hour. I'd then like to turn him loose with those people if they want to talk with him further and I'd like to give him whatever we can of a cook's tour of the building without bothering Security.

ST

25X1

[REDACTED]

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## The SALT 2 Battle

Although the final version of the SALT 2 agreement is being negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union with major points still unresolved, the battle over its acceptance has flared with unprecedented intensity on the U. S. domestic scene.

Among the major points not settled between the two countries are:

- Number of cruise missiles allowed in each airborne vehicle and the means of verification.

- Role of the Backfire bomber. It is now technically outside the SALT agreement, but the U. S. is demanding conditional restraints on its use that the USSR is unwilling to provide.

- Cruise missile ranges, particularly for land-based versions.

- Number of MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) allowed on new ICBMs.

With these major issues still in limbo, both the Carter Administration and its growing opposition have already begun major strategic campaigns to convince the American public of the wisdom of their divergent views. The Carter Administration leaped into the recent congressional election campaign to aid pro-SALT candidates with both threats and promises. The defeat of six pro-SALT senators, including such Democrat stalwarts as Tom McIntyre of New Hampshire, chairman of the influential Armed Services research and development subcommittee, and Dick Clark of Iowa, a former spearhead of the Carter SALT campaign, has had a chilling effect in legislative halls. One indication is the sudden aloofness of the Senate SALT 2 floor leaders, Democrats Gary Hart of Colorado and John Culver from Iowa, the scene of Clark's defeat. Rather than involve themselves ostentatiously in the floor fight, they are now taking a much lower public profile and leaving the job to their staffs.

Meanwhile, the Carter Administration is sending State Dept. "tiger teams" to make pro-SALT 2 pitches to civic leaders in major communities where SALT support is dubious and has buttonholed newly elected legislators on arrival at Washington airports to offer deals for SALT 2 support.

The opposition to SALT 2 has assumed unprecedented intensity both in Congress and in the grass roots, where anti-SALT citizens groups are proliferating and raising substantial war chests for their anti-SALT 2 campaign.

At the same time, there are a number of recent Soviet actions that have shaken the foundations of President Jimmy Carter's position and also raised serious doubts about Russian intentions within the Administration's inner circle. They include:

- Sale of the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite manual to the Soviet Intelligence Agency employee. The KH-11 is a new reconnaissance satellite of vastly improved capability on which the

United States was depending heavily for verification of Soviet compliance with SALT terms. CIA Technical Director Leslie Dirks recently testified at the trial where William Kampiles, a former CIA employee, was convicted of selling the KH-11 manual to the Soviets for \$3,000 that Russian knowledge of the satellite's capabilities would enable them to evade its surveillance and successfully conceal SALT violations.

- Deployment of MiG-23 and MiG-27 nuclear-capable attack aircraft to Cuba. Soviet denial caused President Carter to send SR-71 Mach 3 reconnaissance planes openly over Cuba for verification. This is a scenario reminiscent of Andrei Gromyko's 1962 face-to-face denial to President Kennedy in the White House that the Soviets were deploying IRBM missiles to Cuba at the very moment that U-2 reconnaissance photos confirmed the installations of Shyster and Sandal ballistic missiles. Gromyko is currently Soviet SALT 2 negotiator.

- Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin's angry performance before U. S. senators visiting Moscow reiterating the traditional Soviet doctrine of "What's ours is ours and what's yours is negotiable" and his reemphasis that SALT agreements have nothing to do with curbing aggressive Soviet actions in the rest of the globe.

- Russian moves to erode U. S. verification capability further by returning to coded telemetry in weapons testing and pushing development of a satellite destroyer to operational status. The Soviets stopped coding their telemetry when the U. S. raised it as a SALT 1 violation but recently resumed it. The strong development program to perfect a satellite destroyer provides the capability to blind U. S. verification satellites.

- Soviet development of a "look-down, shoot-down capability" for attacking low-level U. S. bomber and cruise missile penetrations and the first signs of deployment of the new SA-10 defensive missile system.

- Leonid Brezhnev's blunt warning to the U. S. to stay out of Iran, with the threat of Soviet armed intervention.

All of these events have undermined President Jimmy Carter's portrayal of the Soviet leadership as a group with which he can deal effectively in the tenor of the Camp David Middle East negotiations. They also raise grave doubts about the real Soviet intentions around this troubled globe that President Carter has not been able to assuage. They tend to confirm the view of the SALT 2 critics that the Soviet Union believes it has gained the upper hand through a combination of its own increased military strength and the vacillating weakness of U. S. leadership and is pushing this to its limit as it can at every point where weakness is apparent.

—Robert Hotz